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Abstract: 
In the last years, the market of mobile services in Romania had a huge success; the 
number of users of this type of services is constantly growing. The interest of the investors who 
were encouraged by statistics and have recently appeared on the market shows that Romanians 
are  leaders  in  mobile  services  and  that  people  are  very  attached  to  their  mobile  devices. 
ANCOM – the National Authority for Administration and Regulation in Communications) is the 
institution governing the mobile services market in Romania which establishes the rules and 
ensures that the market players comply with these regulations. Its mission is to ensure arbitrage 
on  the  communications  market  and  genuine  competition  for  the  benefit  of  users.  The  major 
objectives of this authority are: to promote competition, protect the interests of users, the use of 
the limited resources, encourage efficient investment in infrastructure, promote innovation. To 
achieve these objectives, the regulatory activity in the communications sector is based on the 
following  principles:  need,  opportunity,  proportionality,  obligation,  technological  neutrality, 
transparency, predictability, stability and resource efficiency. 
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Mobile  services  market  in  Romania  functions  as  an  oligopolistic  structure, 
characterized  by  the  existence  of  a  small  number  of  companies  that  offer  similar 
services. The small  number of mobile services suppliers on the market determines 
their  mutual  interdependence  in  terms  of  sales,  services,  investments  in  new 
technologies and advertising plans. 
The entry barriers (highlighted by the investments required, limited-resource 
management – the spectrum and numbering resources, environmental restrictions on 
the installation of transmitters and international support of the existing operators – the 
power of the groups they belong to) are the main cause of the existence of an oligopoly                                                                                                                             
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on the market. These are relevant in terms of explaining how things happen on this 
kind of market/the phenomena on this kind of market. 
At  present,  in  Romania,  there  are  five  providers  of  telephone  services  by 
means  of  public  land  mobile  networks:  S.C.  Orange  Romania  S.A.,  S.C.  Vodafone 
Romania S.A., S.C. Telemobil S.A. (the brand name "Zapp") - Company purchased by 
Cosmote  RMT  S.A  in  the  summer  of  2009,  S.C.  Cosmote  Romanian  Mobile 
Telecommunications S.A., S.C. RCS & RDS S.A (since 2007) and S.C. Romtelecom 
S.A. 
At  retail  level,  there  has  been  identified  a  group  of  mobile  services  which 
includes all the services provided by means of mobile networks (received calls, dialed 
calls, SMS, international calls, international roaming, emerging services - video and 
data). This group of mobile services is independent of geographical area, generation of 
the technology used or type of consumer (natural or legal person). 
At  wholesale  level,  there  have  been  identified  three  segments:  access  and 
origin, termination and international roaming, with similar scope and content of relevant 
markets  identified  in  the  European  Commission's  recommendations  on  relevant 
markets of products and services in electronic communications sector which can be 
the  object  of  existing  regulations  mobile  services  in  accordance  with  Directive 
2002/21/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  a  common  regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services. 
In  fulfilling  its  statutory  role  and  functions,  ANCOM  -  Autoritatea  Na ională 
pentru  Administrare  şi  Reglementare  în  Comunica ii  (The  National  Authority  for 
Administration  and  Regulation  in  Communications)    constantly  consults  and 
cooperates  with  the  Competition  Council  and  the  National  Authority  for  Consumer 
Protection, for mutual supply of information necessary for implementing the provisions 
of competition law and the provisions of the law on electronic communications and 
protection consumer. 
Promoting competition in the electronic communications sector requires taking 
action in the following areas: 
a)  preventing  actions  that  are  intended  or  have  the  effect  of  distorting  or 
restricting competition in electronic communications and information technology; 
b) taking all measures necessary for users, including those with disabilities or 
special social needs, to maximize the benefits of a competitive market conditions, in 
terms of diversity of offers, rates and service quality; 
c) encouraging efficient investment in infrastructure and promoting innovation;  
d) promoting the efficient use and ensuring effective management of limited 
resources. 
A  supplier  of  electronic  communications  services  is  considered  as  having 
significant power on a particular market if, individually or together with similar suppliers 
enjoys a dominant position. A dominant position on the market means that a supplier of 
electronic communications services is able, to a significant extent, to be independent in 
relation  with competitors,  customers and consumers. Among competitors, there are 
also potential competitors, that  is, those persons  who,  in the  given economic data,    
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have the ability to enter that certain market providing services on other geographic 
areas  or  by  adapting  quickly  the  available  technology,  in  acceptable  efficiency 
conditions. 
To determine the significant power of a supplier on a specific relevant market 
there are taken into account one or more of the following criteria: market share and its 
stability, vertical integration, the number of competitors, the power to deal with users, 
development of prices and profits , degree of products diversity, size of suppliers, the 
absence of potential competitors, control over a network or associated infrastructure, 
hard to duplicate, scale economies, economies of purpose, technological advantage, 
easy or privileged access to financial resources, the existence of a developed network 
of distribution. 
The main criteria that can be used to determine market shares of suppliers are: 
turnover, number of users, traffic volume, capacity of installation, traffic amount. 
For  two  or  more  suppliers  to  jointly  enjoy  significant  power  on  a  relevant 
specific market (collective significant power) it is necessary that they are legally and 
economically independent and to act towards users and competitors as a single entity 
that has significant power on the relevant specific market. 
In  determining  the  existence  of  significant  collective  power  on  a  relevant 
market specific, we may consider one or more of the following criteria: 
  a) market concentration - a high concentration of the market may indicate the 
existence of significant collective power; 
  b) market transparency - collective significant power may arise when suppliers 
can easily obtain information about prices and customers of the competitors; 
  c) maturity of the market - a high degree of maturity of the relevant specific 
market makes more difficult the entry on the market and to attract new customers; 
  d) stagnation or moderate growth of  demand - a rapid  increase  in demand 
stimulates competition on the relevant specific market, suppliers have the opportunity 
to increase market share and profits; 
  e) low elasticity (flexibility) of demand - if demand does not change significantly 
in response to price changes, there is a low motivation of suppliers to reduce prices 
with the purpose to increase their market share; 
  f) homogeneity of products - the higher the homogeneity of products is or it is 
perceived  by  users  in  this  way,  the  more  suppliers’  motivation  to  adopt  a  similar 
behavior  on  the  market  will  increase  in  order  to  avoid  price  competition  and  lower 
profits; 
  g) similar cost structure - at a given price, a similar cost structure will cause a 
similar level of profits and it may lead to a mutual agreement suppliers on prices; 
  h)  similar  market  shares  -  adopting  a  similar  behavior  on  the  market  by 
suppliers can be encouraged by the existence of similar market shares; 
  i) lack of technical innovation and technology maturity – the higher technology 
maturity is, the more the competition by means of technological innovation decreases;                                                                                                                             
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  j) absence of extra capacity - it may prevent the occurrence or maintenance of 
agreements between providers, being stimulated to use additional capacity to increase 
profits; 
  k) high market entry barriers  - the existence of a significant collective power 
on a relevant specific market is favored by high barriers at entry on the market; 
  l) lack of power to deal with users - a high counter-power power of users can 
prevent  the  appearance  of  the  significant  collective  power  on  a  relevant  specific 
market; 
  m) lack of potential competitors - the perspective of entry of new competitors 
on  the  relevant  specific  market  limits  the  possibility  of  existence  of  a  significant 
collective power on that particular market; 
  n) different types of informal links providers likely to have significant collective 
power  -  although  setting  informal  links  between  providers  may  have  a  legitimate 
purpose of solving some common problems raised by their activity, the existence of 
such links may indicate a controversial action on the market; 
  o) existence of mechanisms for counter-attack - providers will be encouraged 
to keep the agreements on the market whether they can expect the implementation of 
measures to counter-attack their competitors in case of breach of such agreements; 
  p) lack of competition or low degree of competition in terms of prices – in case 
suppliers anticipate a strong competition in terms of prices, they may try to prevent 
effective competition between them by an agreement on prices on the market. The 
existence of such agreements might indicate reduced stability or fluctuation in prices 
over time. 
  The increase of competition and the improvement of the transparency of prices 
on  retail  market  were  identified  as  the  main  guidelines  of  action  that  have  guided 
regulatory intervention in the mobile services sector. 
Intervention options to increase competition in mobile phone industry, take into 
consideration the following: regulation of end calls charges of mobile points (reduction 
MTR - Mobile Termination Rate - The average mobile termination rate of the operators 
with  significant  power  on  the  market,  number  portability  (MNP  -  Mobile  Number 
Portability),    granting  of  the  fifth  mobile  license,  prohibiting  terminal  block,  sharing 
infrastructure  and  interconnection,  national  roaming  and  MVNO  (Mobile  Virtual 
Network Operator) access regulation. 
To improve price transparency of retail mobile services, in such a way to help 
users to understand the actual price they pay, there has been identified a number of 
possibilities for intervention. 
In  the  context  of  almost  reaching  the  saturation  level  in  terms  of  mobile 
services  penetration,  most  potential  customers  already  benefit  from  electronic 
communications services and attracting new customers will be achieved mainly on the 
account of competitors’ portfolio. Under these conditions, low fluidity (the fluidity of the 
market occurs when buyers can freely choose their suppliers, and manufacturers can 
freely enter or leave a particular market. In this case, there are no legal or institutional 
barriers for entry of new competitor producers on the market of a particular product) on    
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the retail market segment means that the effective competition occurs at a particular 
reduced  scale  as  a  whole  segment;  this  means  that  this  reduced  competition  is 
manifested mainly at consumer’s level as they may change the service provider based 
on contracts or agreements that can be easily terminated. 
According to economic theory, perfect competition is characterized by a series 
of cumulative characteristics: atomicity of participants, mobility of production factors, 
fluidity and market transparency (market transparency defines that situation in which all 
players  on  a  given  market,  whether  suppliers  or  consumers  are  perfectly  informed 
about the structure and operation of the market and can anticipate changes that may 
occur),  product  homogeneity.  As  pure  and  perfect  competition  does  not  match  the 
actual  functioning  of  economies  and  markets,  promoting  this  model  of  competition 
cannot  be  a  goal  of  regulation.  Implementing  legislation  requires  minimizing 
intervention to promote that level of competition that maximizes social welfare. 
Thus, one can think that the extension of competition area by improving the 
fluidity  of  retail  segments  and  as  well  support  for  rational  and  informed  consumer 
behavior represent regulatory options to maximize social welfare. 
In terms of actions to improve competition on retail markets by encouraging 
their  fluidity,  dynamic  segments  indicate  the  need  to  supplement  at  wholesale 
asymmetric interventions, aimed primarily to stimulate supply (introduction of selection 
/  preselection  of  the  carrier),  by  creating  the  conditions  for  alternative  operators  to 
compete with symmetrical regulatory instruments aimed at all active operators on the 
retail market, in the corresponding homogeneous segments (number portability). 
Theory and practice of regulation in various sectors have indicated that the 
asymmetry between the information available to consumers against suppliers of the 
services  provided  and  fees,  distort  consumer  behavior  by  increasing  the  artificial 
demand based on the complexity of charges. Consumers should be helped to adopt a 
rational behavior, according to their needs, both in terms of choice of service provider 
and in terms of the option for a particular service offer. Increasing consumer demand 
based on consumer information asymmetry is not likely to increase social welfare (see 
Figure 1). 
The  policy  of  stimulating  fluidity  and  transparency  does  not  aim  at  direct 
intervention  in  retail  markets,  or  limiting  its  value  to  the  creative  imagination  of 
marketing policies, but aims at ensuring that suppliers' market actions are not at the 
expense of consumers. This policy must consider the extent to which, on the one hand, 
the information consumers need to make choices are available at a reasonable level of 
transparency and accessibility, and, secondly, that users can switch services without 
facing undue obstacles. 
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Figure 1. The effects of information asymmetry 
 
Policy elements to stimulate fluidity and transparency in the retail market is 
intertwined with elements of access policy (in terms of network access solutions for 
carrier selection and preselection), interconnection policy, etc. 
Packages  and  schemes  for  end-user  prices  have  become  increasingly 
complex over time: multiple pricing plans, rates for calling within / outside network, to 
the  mobile  /  fixed  network,  at  /  off  rush  hour,  according  to  destination,  the  favorite 
numbers and many other options. 
Such  complexity  makes  practically  impossible  for  the  end  user  to  control 
expenditure  on  communications  services  and  he/she  is  moving  away  from  taking 
rational decisions on the choice of provider or even of his/her consumer behavior. 
Improving  the  level  of  information  for  users  and  reducing  the  complexity  in 
retail rates help to improve consumer power, which will make the consumers to defend 
better their interests. Also, increased transparency in terms of comparative levels of 
charges depending on the type of supply or traffic light profile is likely to help citizens to 
make consumer choices based on rational criteria. 
Given these considerations, the strategic objective of the regulation aims "to 
create an environment where information on availability, supply conditions and tariffs of 
services must be transparent, easy to access and available to all citizens”
 (Document 
by ANCOM  regarding the Regulation Strategy in the electronic communications sector 
in Romania during the period 2007-2010). 
In  achieving  this  goal,  the  regulation  authorities  require  from  operators  the 
following: 
Develop a web page dedicated to information needs of users - such instrument 
would aim to provide a user-friendly interface for citizens, in a non-technical language,    
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to provide relevant information and answers to questions on key issues concerning 
their relationships with suppliers of electronic communications services and to reduce 
information  asymmetry  of  demand  in  relation  to  the  supply  of  electronic 
communications services. 
Detailed Billing (Invoices) – Establishing the information to be presented in the 
detailed  invoices  issued  by  the  mobile  service  providers  is  a  regulatory  tool  that 
provides end users a minimum of information to help improve awareness of tariffs, to 
facilitate understanding of pricing services used and to allow verification of content of 
the bills issued by providers in terms of protecting users' privacy rights of callers and 
the called subscribers. 
Tools for comparing prices (completion of this project is estimated in the third 
quarter of 2011) - making available through Web pages, a tool to enable comparison of 
information on rates and conditions offered by different suppliers, to ensure potential 
users  make  independent  assessments.  This  instrument  takes  the  form  of  "search 
engine" available online, updated with efficiency, to generate the best offers available 
at any given time for a specific consumer profile. An additional facility would provide an 
existing classification of tenders based on predefined criteria (e.g. "the best offers for 
calls to fixed networks). 
The regulation authority action has a limitation effect on the free competition 
and replaces the market forces; therefore it must be temporary and have a limited 
range of action; in addition it must be suppressed as soon as effective competition can 
be supported by the market forces. Thus, in order to avoid market distortion or the 
creation of premises for dominant position abuse by the economic agents subjected to 
the regulations, the regulation actions need to be approached through the perspective 
of the competition law, by thoroughly applying its principles. Consequently, regulations 
must  be  justified,  proportional,  appropriate,  undiscriminating  and  limited  both  in 
duration and in range as far as the imposed remedies and the operators subjected to 
the regulations are concerned. The regulation authority must identify those measures 
which either open the market and insure new entries, or, as in this case, replace the 
market force. 
In order to regulate some markets, the regulation authorities must analyze if 
the following criteria are cumulatively fulfilled:  
    - the presence of untransitory barriers (of structural or legal nature) at entering 
the market; 
    - the lack of  analyzed market features that would determine its trend towards 
effective  competition  (this  criterion  shall  be  considered  even  if  there  are  barriers 
encountered at market entrance); 
    -  only  the  compliance  of  the  competition  law  cannot  efficiently  remedy  the 
deficiencies that the market presents. 
Any public mobile network operator has a monopoly on the end calls services 
market in their own network. Due to the lack of competition constraints made on mobile 
spots end calls service suppliers, their action to reduce the price of mobile spots end 
calls  services  to  an  efficient  level  is  unlikely.  Another  important  aspect  is  that,                                                                                                                             
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considering that the average prices for the calls made in the same network are nearly 
50% lower compared to the average call prices to other public mobile networks, the 
percentage  of  same  network  calls  within  the  total  public  mobile  calls  in  Romania 
remained  constantly  at  high  levels  of  76  -  78%,  within  the  period  2004  –  2007. 
Consequently,  the  operators  have  both  the  possibility  and  the  interest  to  apply 
excessive prices for supplying these services to their competition both to raise their 
costs, and to maximize thus the benefits of their own end users at the expense other 
networks users. Thus, mobile service providers can show a discriminating behavior by 
charging  higher  tariffs  for  end  calls  originating  from  networks  of  other  providers, 
compared  with  domestic  supply  of  services;  the  consequence  is  the  increase 
competitors’ costs by increasing the afferent costs of providing services at the level of 
retail market. If the difference between the retail network and end calls rates in the 
wholesale  market  is  unable  to  provide  sufficient  margin  for  the  supplier  competitor 
activity in the retail market and to offer reply, there may appear practices of "predatory 
pricing" or "margin squeeze". 
  Economic theory has highlighted the need for a balance between the need to 
ensure a framework to encourage market entry (by anticipating a reasonable level of 
profit  for  potential  new  players,  with  the  prospect  of  depreciation  of  infrastructure 
investments)  and  also  stimulate  competition  on  merit  principle  designed  to  ensure 
consumer welfare. Therefore, imposing obligations on authorized operators there must 
be taken into account the investment made by that provider to allow for a reasonable 
rate of return on capital invested, considering the risks associated with investment. Any 
cost  recovery  mechanism  or  pricing  methodology  required  by  the  Authority  must 
promote economic efficiency and competition and maximize consumer benefits. Thus, 
ANCOM must provide correct economic signals to the economic operators who wish to 
enter the market and to increase business efficiency, investment and innovation in a 
dynamic  perspective,  creating  a  fair  and  predictable  competitive  environment. 
Therefore, the regulation authority must ensure that, on the one hand, this regulatory 
action  has  no  adverse  effects,  to  deter  new  entry  and  reduce  competition  at 
infrastructure  level,  and  on  the  other  hand,  it  leads  competition  stimulation  and  a 
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